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The rain expresses his longing, the berries his hunger and the night his fear. But nothing expresses his physical pain. (Scarry 1985: 161)

We all know what pain is. We have all suffered from it. Sometimes, we hardly notice it. Sometimes, it’s unbearable. Usually, it goes away on its own. Sometimes, it goes away with treatment. Rarely, it doesn’t go away at all, but becomes persistent (sometimes called chronic) pain. (Clayton et al. 2010)

BLOK/EKO circles around a symbiosis between pain and poetry: pain is required to create exceptional poetry, and poetry is required to alleviate pain. It is set in ‘no place or time’ (Barker 2010b), a pseudo-medieval world constructed of familiar Barkerian residues that have crystallized as a kingdom on the edge of crisis. Three poets provide the tensioned warp to the fabric of this world: the successful but mediocre Pindar, the brilliant but destitute Tot, and the queen’s aide and lover Blok. Around this male warp weave the women of the piece; the queen, Eko, who does not speak but only sings, her interpreters Quota and Nausicaa, and the last of the doctors, Quasidoc, who denies medicine to save her life, but in so doing becomes a poet’s prize. In many ways she embodies a key thematic thread of the play – the sacrifice of medicine for the valorization of poetry. 
In this despotic realm, queen Eko has decided to order the execution of all members of the medical profession, the doctors, and replace their ministrations with poetry through the work of state-sponsored poets. Within the world of the play, her motivation for this ‘extermination’ is unclear, and feared as ‘an admirable initiative […] carried to excess’ to become a ‘torrent of undiscriminating persecution’ (Barker 2010a: 19). Yet in his synopsis of the play, Howard Barker offers a clear-cut logic for this decision: Eko wishes to ‘enhance the status of poetry’ (XX in this issue). Her intention is clear, but her motivation is not. What is it to ‘enhance the status of poetry’? Why would this be beneficial? Would such a genocide ever be possible? And, what are the consequences of removing medicine by carrying out ‘[t]he annihilation of the doctors’?  (Barker 2010a: 30). This tension provides drama: in the space between clarity and ambiguity, Barker offers the opportunity to revel in ‘[t]he ecstasy of vanishing meaning. Hiding in plethora. In the forest of concepts a pure stream’ (2004: 14). This article explores the tension between clarity and ambiguity. It follows the trail of vanishing meaning in order to journey through a forest of ideas created by the queen’s decision to replace medicine with poetry. In so doing, it uses BLOK/EKO as a poetic lens through which to examine our relationship to pain in the twenty-first century. 
Pain is a plethoric concept: it is, to use W. B. Gallie’s term, essentially contested; that is to say, we might broadly agree what it means in general but on closer inspection we would find it difficult to reach a fixed and nuanced definition (1956 :167–98). This complexity is compounded because pain is not only essentially contested as a cognitive concept; it is also essentially contested as an embodied experience. We all experience pain, it is a rare universal.​[1]​ But no two experiences of pain between individuals are the same. Mine is not the same as yours. Nor is any one individual’s experience of two different pain events an exact replica. We make sense of these events in different ways through shifting contextualizing frameworks (Breznitz 1999; Salomans et al. 2004; Master et al. 2009; Hickey 2010; Coakley 2007). We might therefore say that pain is a bio-cultural experience. Moreover, these experiences are difficult to describe: as Pekala and Cardeña have noted, there is a tendency to use ‘the evocative language of poetry’ to describe an event that is beyond the cognitive, rather than ‘a more analytic, denotative language’ (Cardeña and Pekala 2000: 53). In BLOK/EKO, Barker extends this tendency. He does not simply use the poetic instead of the denotative, he intentionally removes the doctors who are personification of the analytic. This leaves no choice for the public, represented by the chorus on stage, but to engage with the ‘evocative language of poetry’. With its eradication of the medical profession, the play holds open a space in which another, deeper level of the bio-cultural phenomenon of pain can be explored.

The humanities are well placed to deal with the difficulty of understanding bio-cultural experience; one can point to landmark works such as Scarry’s The Body in Pain (1985) and J. Butler’s Bodies That Matter (Butler 1993), which engage with pain as a complex, temporally situated and culturally articulated embodied phenomenon. However, in this broad engagement, in particular the symbolic dimensions of pain, some key details have been overlooked – both the quotidian reality of pain and the distinction between different sorts of pain: for biomedicine, pain tends to be acute or chronic. This is an oversimplification – as has already been noted the experience of pain is simultaneously emotional, spiritual and cultural, as well as somatic. However, this reduction is worth sustaining because BLOK/EKO offers a particularly interesting insight into chronic pain.  In simple terms acute pain goes away, chronic pain does not. It is usually defined as pain that lasts three or more months (Merskey and Bogduk 1994). It is common, and its impact and expression depend on sociocultural conditions (Scarry 1985; Morris 1993; Bendelow and Williams 1995). Chronic pain is not just about the body, it encompasses a complex set of experiences and behaviours that affect all aspects of a person’s life (Breivik et al. 2006).  In our current culture people turn to the medical profession to seek answers and help, but they are often let down: good pain relief cannot be achieved for many, and understanding is rarely obtained (Thorstensson et al. 2009; Mann and Gooberman-Hill 2011). Therefore many people have to ‘live’ with it. It shapes who they are, and yet the question of pain-that-does-not-go-away has been the subject of little humanities scrutiny. As Morris notes, Scarry in her ‘admirable book’,

has very little to say about recent medical research into pain, about the crucial distinction between acute and chronic pain. […] people in pain today owe no small amount of their torment to the lack of cultural understanding that combines the insights of numerous fields. (Morris 1993: 5)

This lack of cultural understanding pivots on a simple point. In a culture dominated by a particular model of western-developed biomedicine​[2]​ there is an expectation that our lives will be pain free. And this model is supported by our experience of acute pain. We feel it. It is treated. It goes away. However, chronic pain persists. Those who experience it cannot make sense of it in these terms, and this is, in part, the ‘torment’ to which Morris refers.  Moreover, Morris’ position reflects a popular sense that all are entitled to be pain free. Barker disagrees.

	For Barker pain is necessary. As he closes his second theoretical work, Death, the One and The Art of Theatre (2004), he states:

It is impossible – now, at this point in the long journey of human culture – to avoid the sense that pain is necessity; that it is neither accident, nor malformation, nor malice, nor misunderstanding, that it is integral to the human character both in its inflicting and in its suffering, this terrible sense Tragedy alone has articulated, and will continue to articulate, and in so doing, make beautiful… (105)

There are two elements at work here; first, Barker’s belief that pain is necessary ‘to the human character’ and second, that it is articulated by ‘Tragedy alone’; Barker’s own model of tragedy, Theatre of Catastrophe. I first want to consider the question, of Barker, chronic pain, necessity and the human character, before moving on to reflect on its Tragic articulation. This is a complex area that many scholars from plural disciplines have been engaged with for some time and so, necessarily, this discussion will be slight in comparison to the weight of available literature, but I hope it will act as a provocation for others to engage with this important sociocultural and economic question: how do we deal with chronic pain as a society? 

We are living longer thanks to better drugs and health care interventions. However, as we do so, we carry with us an increasing burden of diseases that were previously terminal. These are now treatable, but often we cannot return to our former state of well-being. This means that the pain associated with these diseases, along with conditions like arthritis, fibromyalgia, diabetic neuropathy and depression, is chronic and on the rise. Simultaneously, we expect increasingly innovative and long-term medical interventions that necessarily have a significant, growing financial cost, in particular for the State through the NHS. This is a worldwide issue. In 2011 Director General of the World Health Organisation, Margaret Chan, described the increase of these chronic, non-communicable diseases as:

a slow-motion catastrophe […] In wealthy countries, deaths from heart disease and strokes have declined significantly, cancer patients are being cured or surviving longer and people with diabetes have better access to essential and effective treatments. But this apparent success gives a distorted picture. It leaves the impression of a manageable situation and conceals what is, in reality, an impending disaster. (Chan 2011: n.p.)

This language of ‘slow-motion catastrophe’ is disturbingly resonant with the world of the play. For Chan, the impending disaster is created by the mismatch between expectation and resources. We expect to be pain free and for medicine to continue to advance. This is unsustainable. 

	Barker champions the necessity of pain, but its increase would not necessarily give him satisfaction; there are few of us would wish chronic pain for ourselves or another. Instead, the challenge on offer is to (re)consider our cultural relationship to pain. The imagined world of BLOK/EKO gives us a model that operates in extremis – both at the farthest reaches of the medical genocide and at the point of death. Yet, by inverting cultural-norms, and holding open a space with extremes, Barker troubles our normalized desire for, and expectation of, full and absolute pain relief. In BLOK/EKO the underlying throb of this relentless cull of medical practitioners – beaten out against a soundscape of winches and pendulums, breaking glass and chanting crowds – finds form in scene 29 of the 104 scene work. In it, the embodiment of the queen’s strategy is wheeled before the chorus, the public, in the form of Truck, the last remaining surgeon. He is bare-chested and bound to a stainless steel mortuary gurney. In ‘[..a] sudden splash of anger’ the public surge forward to take up scalpels left by the queen’s servant, Blok, in order to claim their opportunity to ‘cut the last of them’ (Barker 2010a: 30). This action leaves them without medical care in general, and pain relief in particular. From the perspective of the dominant assumption, which argues that to be pain free is a human right, this is a callous act. It is beyond redemption and turns the world upside down. 

This cultural inversion is not simple: the genocide of medicine creates a void that is impossible for poetry to fill. This action is not a process of even exchange – neither poetry nor pain is sufficiently reducible to make an easy substitution of one to another. This difficulty provides a point of drama: against the necessary symbiosis of pain and poetry, the impossible of transfer of one for another is played out.  This complexity is expressed by a member of the mob: Plate, a mother grieving for her dead child, challenges the poet Tot on this matter:

Does the poem/wash the wound/Tot?/Does it bandage it?
It doesn’t/does it/wash the blood away? (Barker 2010a: 34)

Through this series of questions, our first, commonsensical thoughts are confirmed:  poetry cannot directly replace medicine in the alleviation of pain: it cannot wash or bandage a wound. Poetry cannot wash the blood away. In such a direct comparison, it appears then that poetry has failed in this new world order because it cannot replace medicine’s visceral interventions. It cannot patch the broken body. It cannot deliver a pain-free world.

This scene however offers other perspectives. As we watch the murder of the last surgeon unfold, the logic of Eko’s stratagem is far from clear. Perhaps, through the genocide, she is protecting her people and their capacity to experience a phenomenon that is integral to human character that is under threat from the ‘spurious practitioners of pain relief’ (Barker 2010a: 30). This position is well supported: the idea that pain is a human necessity is prevalent in Barker’s theoretical writing and interviews ([1989] 1997, 2004, 2007; Brown 2011: 30, 37, 43–48, 52–55, 57–65, 70–75, 88–92). Or, perhaps, this is political. It is hard to accept that the removal of the doctors will be beneficial and their replacement with poets will provide better relief from suffering. Instead, it seems more likely that the motivation for this action is the eradication of medicine and the idea-of-medicine, the consequence of which will be to remove a challenge to the queen’s despotic position. However, this causality is flawed. Eko has deliberated – intensely: we are told by her loyal servant, Blok, that she came to this decision during an eight-day fast when ‘[p]rofound consideration she gave to this decision/ profound’ (Barker 2010a: 32). It seems unlikely that such deliberation would lead to the development of suicidal action plan for a despot’s realm, even if that despot’s ‘life thus far has been characterized by perfect health’ (Barker 2010a: 28). To this plethora - of protection, politics and fasting - Barker adds one further layer of complexity in the scene that follows Truck’s murder. It has just one line: ‘SHE KNOWS THE SICKNESS OF THE DOCTORS’ (Barker 2010a: 29). In offering an apparent justification for the queen’s actions, Blok uses the language of medicine to undermine its own power-base. He asserts Eko’s absolute power – only she knows what this sickness is – and he justifies the annihilation of the doctors by identifying the need for the eradication of this disease. Is the sickness of the doctors their desire to create a pain-free world? Perhaps this is so: the queen’s dying words of contempt for the poet Pinder are to wish him ‘a life of painlessness’ (Barker 2010a: 85). Again, the play troubles our dominant assumptions about a pain-free existence.

In our popular imagination doctors’ practice resides within the confines of the Hippocratic Oath, a ‘solemn promise’ of ‘beneficence’ and ‘non-maleficence’. Yet, in Eko’s realm what it is to do good and not harm has changed: medical interventions are now criminal. In response, a new culture emerges. While the doctors are annihilated, the poets emerge to take up state-funded and valorized posts and replace the doctors as the creators of the thing that ‘kills the pain’. Through this transition it is no longer the doctor who cures, or even the poet, but rather the thing that the poet creates – the poem. Poems are made effective through reception. And in this regard doctors and poets are similar in what they do: the efficacy of their output lies in its reception by another. Medicine, like poetry, has created reception rites that are made meaningful through tangible and intangible culture: one of these is surgery – an example Schechner draws on to describe the ways in which we might better understand everyday life through the metaphor of performance (Schechner 2002: 180–81). To explore similarity this I want to return to scene 29, the murder of the last surgeon, Truck. 

We see medicine as a cultural form through Truck’s death. His death is played out through a transmuted surgical procedure created by queen’s realm. With a response of desperate eloquence, to each member of the crowd competitively justifying their ‘obligation’ to kill him, Truck submits to the logic of Eko’s realm and confesses the barbarity of his practice in order to pause the scalpel-wielding mob:

	I / THE FINAL DOCTOR / CONFESS MY OWN BARBARITY / 
	And I saved babies / WRONGLY / 
	By my own skill I cut infant mortality by one hundred and seventeen per cent / 
	SKILL / SKILL / 
	PERVERSE MISAPPREHENSION / 
	KILL ME / KILL THE ONE WHO CLAIMED TO KNOW THE BONES AND BOWELS OF KINDNESS / 
 (Barker 2010a: 31)

Through this speech, we come to know that to save babies, and reduce infant mortality is now wrong. In Eko’s realm, the desire to do so is a perverse misapprehension on the part of someone who understood his practices as acts of kindness. The role of medicine has been inverted: it is no longer held in high esteem and Truck’s eloquence provides him brief respite – it is clear that the crowd is going to kill him. However, their verbal passion and fury is not enacted through a surge of animalistic, pack-anger that would seems to be the logical development of their collective chanting and grouping onstage.  They instead form an orderly queue to take up their scalpels, along with the language of the operating theatre, to ‘open him’ and ‘cut’. The surging mob, paradoxically, is contained by the words and actions of medicine whose practices they are currently obliterating: they operate surgically in both action and form. Medicine is destroyed by a reenactment of its own practices and languages. It destroys itself, embodied by the public. Through this action we witness that it both constructs, and is a construction of culture: we see its enculturated destruction and destructive force.

To have no medicine to relieve pain inverts our understanding of the world: it is the antithesis of how the socio-cultural and economic frameworks that sustain the dominance of allopathic medicine and describe the overriding curative and pain-free paradigm. It is so embedded into our cultural construction of the world that its removal is deeply disturbing – almost unimaginable. And yet, current constructions of medicine must be scrutinized. As noted earlier, current approaches are feeding a worldwide ‘slow-motion catastrophe’ (Chan 2011: n.p.). However, this is not the story we tell ourselves as a society, instead, the idea that an increased medical capacity is the mark of a successful society dominates. For Barker this is a reflection of the flawed humanist project:

We think of ‘civilized’ society in a new, late humanist way.  It is now defined by its success in abolishing pain.  That was never the case in earlier cultures.  We pay a price for this. (Barker 2012: n.p.)
The drivers for Barker’s concerns, for the price we pay, are not the same as those for the Director of the World Health Organization, Chan. And, on face value, Barker’s price as axiom is not equivalent to Chan’s economically driven price. Yet, if we put to one side for a moment the desire to be pain free, and consider our current situation in relation to recent medical research, then we might see that the in extremis model offered by Barker of poetry instead of medicine has some merit – to assuage both prices. To explore this idea further it is first useful to consider how western-centric developed-medicine functions. 

Western developed-medicine grows from a knowledge base that is grounded in the randomized controlled trial (RCT). The RCT is the preferred form of clinical trial. It tests the efficacy of an intervention in a patient population in comparison with a control group that receives either no intervention, or often, a placebo. The trial is designed to remove bias; that is to say, the variability of human existence – our belief and will, practice and inconsistencies. The dominance of the RCT means that pain medicine is shaped by its attempt to reduce the complexities of the contextualized human pain experience to a singular biomedical malfunction of the body treated by analgesics, or a psychological pain that can be measured through symptom scales and behavioural checklists. Therefore, the RCT is a problematic model for establishing appropriate treatment of pain. Its limitations are demonstrated by recent research setting out to understand the genuine healing response generated through placebos given as part of an RCT because, in an RCT, the control group receiving the placebo is not expected to benefit from the trial (Doherty and Dieppe 2007; Zhang et al. 2008; Gooberman-Hill et al. 2009). The dominant form of medicine finds it difficult to account for how the ways in which we interpret our world affect our experience of pain.  

Many working in medicine are looking for ways of going beyond the limitations to the RCT to examine pain as a complex, temporally situated and culturally articulated embodied phenomenon. And, recent studies into our experience of pain have found that effecting the cultural articulation of the phenomenon can have an impact on its successful control. A diverse range of approaches have been shown to have an effect; cognitive (Wiech et al. 2008b), belief based (Salomans et al. 2004; Wiech et al. 2008a) and emotional (Breznitz 1999). These have shown that we can modulate our experience of pain by changing what it means to us. This is predominantly a cultural process. It does not make pain disappear, but changes how we respond, react and feel about it. The particular process I want to focus on here is one of reappraisal, where we reinterpret the meaning of the noxious stimulus of pain. This is not about distracting us from pain, but rather about changing the ‘threat value’ of the pain. The reappraisal process enables us to feel control over the emotions associated with pain, predominantly fear, and enables us to change the meanings we give them. This means our interpretation of pain shifts, and as a consequence the significance of the pain is diminished: although the pain itself does not change, it means something different. This suggests that the triggering of wider belief structures modulate our pain experience – structures that are formed by our dominant culture. Much research has shown ways in which beneficial pain reappraisal might be achieved through meditation or religious belief. No one, as of yet, has shown that poetry does so. But, BLOK/EKO offers the opportunity to consider that possibility. If we take, for example, the scene just after Truck’s death, and reconsider it through the process of reappraisal then in response to Plate’s question: ‘Does the poem/wash the wound/Tot?/Does it bandage it?’ (Barker 2010a: 34), one could reasonably respond that poetry may not mend the broken body, but it could alleviate the pain. Perhaps, in Eko’s realm, the replacement of medicine with poetry to alleviate pain is a perfectly reasonable process. 

	Turning now towards the conclusion, I want to circle back to Barker’s closing statement in Death, the One and the Art of Theatre:
It is impossible – now, at this point in the long journey of human culture – to avoid the sense that pain is necessity; that it is neither accident, nor malformation, nor malice, nor misunderstanding, that it is integral to the human character both in its inflicting and in its suffering, this terrible sense Tragedy alone has articulated, and will continue to articulate, and in so doing, make beautiful… (2004: 105)







To indicate the burden of pain with which each syllable is to be uttered. (Houth and Barker 2007: 15)

The pain is expressed through the visual pattern on the page. In many ways it is simple; a series of words to be repeated, but the text in performance is more than that. As Barker explains, when describing Iain McDiarmid’s performance in Terrible Mouth, text resonates in context. It is the actor who causes the text to both sound and be received. 

Through a sob, that could not be articulated as a word, Barker explains that McDiarmid:
  
found […] not a conclusion to an emotion, but the essence of it […] He invested it with his physical resources as well as his mental agony so that his body struggled with the failure of words, as if words had been driven out of the cavities they inhabited – lungs, mouth, and arching throat – leaving gaping muscularity behind them, and into this vacuum flooded nothing but incomprehensible pain. […] Here was the hypnotic spectacle of another’s pain, solitarily suffered yet giving strength, for what McDiarmid dared and triumphed in, we also might. There was a full ten seconds here, but such an anatomy of anguish one watched as if a cadaver were flayed before our eyes by skilfully wielded knives, showing us what lay horrifically beneath surfaces […] It was experience exemplified. 
(Barker [1989] 1997: 130–31)

Here, Barker articulates the complexity of performance: the actor does not just recognize the code on the page and express it via the multiple, shifting contexts they and the world of the play offer. Nor do they simply provide their body as vessel so that violence or agony might be explicitly articulated. Nor do they only express an implicit mental pain that is held on the edges of the character’s consciousness, not quite allowed to reach the verbal articulation of the performer. With their whole being, and all its knowledges, they have the capacity to provide the spectacle of another’s pain – without re-living it fully themselves. Freeland has suggested that pain in Barker is ‘a zone – where speech breaks off leaving the pain to signify on its own’ (Freeland 2011: 79).  I want to suggest that this zone is the culmination of recognition of pain on the part of the audience, but that actually it is ‘always a tremendous presence’ (Brown 2011: 37) And it is this unrelenting quality that the audience recognize, even if they do not understand it in a way they are able to articulate through narrative. In Barker’s plays pain is not acute. It is not treatable. It does not go away. It is chronic.

There are important threads to be drawn together here. I am not suggesting that chronic pain has found its only expression in the Tragic form of Theatre of Catastrophe, but it does offer an important perspective as a poetic lens through which to examine our relationship to pain in the twenty-first century. Barker has noted, that with Theatre of Catastrophe ‘there is no tragic dénouement which reinforces the existing moral consensus. Rather, the plays remove, plank by plank, the floor of existing moral opinion in or to please other, unarticulated causes’. (Brown 2011: 63) When addressing the ‘slow-motion catastrophe’ of the unsustainable increase in resources required to manage chronic pain, BLOK/EKO removes the ‘floor of existing moral opinion’ that sustains a common perception that to be pain free is a right. It holds open a space in which we might think the unthinkable. Moreover, in light of recent research into the process of reappraising pain, unexpectedly, Theatre of Catastrophe might then be seen as an analgesic, of sorts. This is not because it numbs the pain – I am not suggesting that poetry is a direct replacement for asprin – but because it honours the existence of pain and in so doing offers the means for the audience to reconsider it and relocate it in our own particular realm of experience. Much of Barker’s work has been concerned with pain, desire and death and its theatrical representation as marking the threshold between aesthetics and metaphysics. Pain is not a separate element from the totality of human experience, alive or dead but a necessary, yet consolable grief. The theme of pain is not revolutionary for the Arts in general, and Barker in particular. The cultural space catalyzed by the relationship between pain and poetry has long been fruitful; pain has fuelled works of great beauty. And yet, in this creative exchange, often pain retains the upper hand. It is not diminished by art; it merely provides respite through self-expression and reception, rather than being the source of healing from suffering. On first reading this is also true of BLOK/EKO and pain. Pain continues despite the interventions of the poets. But on closer examination the rules of the realm speak to a deeper understanding of how humanity copes with pain, not by its eradication, but by changing its significance. 
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^1	  Or in the rare case, such as American railway construction foreman Pheneas Gage, where an individual feels no pain they are held up as a curiosity: they become the subject of a travelling show or Channel 5 documentary where the narrative surrounding individuals like Gage tends to focus on how since their loss, they lack morality and are unable to control their ‘animalistic’ desires.
^2	  Contemporary western medicine grew from an elemental view of health: one where soma, psyche and pneuma could be treated separately. This, overlaid with eighteenth century move towards rationality and reductionism, and the later development of the randomized controlled trial, made both contextualizing experiences and holistic approaches to medicine irrelevant to the dominant form. This is not the case for all systems of medicine or cultural approaches to well-being. Yet, the western model of biomedicine has expanded to become primary across the globe: making, as Kleinman suggests, the term ‘Western’ redundant (1995: 25). For a crisp overview of this construction see Cardeña and Pekala (2000: 354).
